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INTRODUCTION 
The most recent King County One Night Count reported a staggering 
11,643 unhoused individuals living on the streets of King County in early 
2017,1 a 9% year-over-year increase from 2016.2 This rise occurred despite 
King County Executive Dow Constantine and Seattle Mayor Ed Murray’s 
declaration of local homelessness as a “state of emergency” in 2015. 3 This 
critical declaration gave the municipalities access to emergency funding 
to begin addressing the underlying issues contributing to the dramatic rise 
in the unhoused population.4 A prominent segment of the unhoused 
population is a group sometimes described as “hiding in plain sight”: 
vehicle residents.5 While technically counted as unsheltered, vehicle 
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 1. ALL HOME, HOMELESSNESS IN KING COUNTY (2017) [hereinafter 2017 ONE NIGHT COUNT], 
http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-Count-Us-In-Infographic.pdf. 
 2. ALL HOME, KING COUNTY ONE NIGHT COUNT SUMMARY OF 2016 DATA, http://allhomekc. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2016-KC-ONC-numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q527-LVMP] 
(updated May 9, 2016). 
 3. Daniel Beekman and Jack Broom, Mayor, County Exec Declare ‘State of Emergency’ Over 
Homelessness, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/mayor-county-exec-declare-state-of-emergency-over-homelessness/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z4U5-NPSL] (“[L]ocal leaders Monday declared states of emergency in Seattle and King County.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Ashwin Warrior, Everyone Counts: Including Vehicle Residents Hiding in Plain Sight, 
FIRESTEEL (Jan. 29, 2013), http://firesteelwa.org/2013/01/everyone-counts-including-vehicle-
residents-hiding-in-plain-sight/ [https://perma.cc/AE5Q-PHLY]. 
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residents are able to utilize their vehicle as a primary means of shelter and, 
unsurprisingly, make up a significant portion of the total unsheltered 
population6—42% per the 2017 One Night Count Results.7 
“Banishing vehicle residency is one of the fastest-growing forms of 
criminalization.”8 In 2014, a nationwide survey by the National Law 
Center on Homelessness and Poverty found that the number of cities with 
ordinances that effectively criminalized vehicle habitation increased by 
119% between 2011 and 2014.9 These ordinances take the form of metered 
street parking zones,10 permit-only parking zones,11 time restrictions,12 
restrictions on vehicle operability,13 restrictions regarding licensing and 
registration,14 and even prohibitions directed specifically at vehicle 
habitation.15 Violations of these policies typically result in noncriminal 
citations imposing fees, requiring attendance at hearings, or inflicting 
other financial burdens, which nevertheless can have devastating impacts 
on someone with already limited resources.16 Additionally, the effects of 
these typically noncriminal citations can be exacerbated by the 
implementation of “scofflaw ordinances.” Scofflaw ordinances escalate 
penalties and financial burdens by allowing for the extrajudicial 
impoundment of the targeted vehicle for specific violations, such as 
                                                     
 6. Heidi Groover, “My Van Was Just Gone.” Homeless Advocates Ask City to Stop Ticketing, 
Towing Vehicles People Live In, THE STRANGER (Oct. 3, 2017, 4:27 PM), http://www.thestranger. 
com/slog/2017/10/03/25450050/my-van-was-just-gone-homeless-advocates-ask-city-to-stop-
ticketing-towing-vehicles-people-live-in [https://perma.cc/G7EA-37XX]. 
 7. 2017 ONE NIGHT COUNT, supra note 1. 
 8. Jessica So et al., Living at the Intersection: Laws and Vehicle Residency, HOMELESS RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY PROJECT 3 (Sara Rankin ed., May 2016) [hereinafter “Living at the Intersection”], 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2776423 [https://perma.cc/XFW5-G8BQ]. 
 9. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 15 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter “NATIONAL LAW 
CENTER”], https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/FU3X-TEEH]. 
 10. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0106 (2018); KIRKLAND, WASH., 
PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.230 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.76.015 (2018). 
 11. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.2014; SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE 
ORDINANCE § 86.0143 (2018); KIRKLAND, WASH., PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.240 (2018); 
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.14.515 (2018). 
 12. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0118 (2018); KIRKLAND, WASH., 
PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.300 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.240 (2018); 
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.260 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.440 
(2018). 
 13. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0137 (2018); SANTA BARBARA, CAL., 
ZONING ORDINANCES § 30.175.030(M) (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.92.010; 
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.92.020 (2018). 
 14. E.g., SANTA BARBARA, CAL., ZONING ORDINANCES § 30.175.030(M) (2018); KIRKLAND, 
WASH., PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.170 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.22.070 
(2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.145 (2018). 
 15. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0137 (2018). 
 16. Rianna Hidalgo, The Pile Up, REAL CHANGE (Aug. 5, 2015), http://realchangenews.org/ 
2015/08/05/pile [https://perma.cc/Q5J8-CKNN]. 
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accumulating a certain threshold of unpaid fines, or exceeding specified 
time restrictions.17 These restrictions are typically justified by 
municipalities as necessary to address public order or health and safety 
concerns;18 however, the policies are also driven by pressure from 
community members who fear that allowing overnight parking will invite 
problems stereotypically associated with vehicle residents.19 
In addition to being disproportionately impacted by these laws due 
to limited financial resources, vehicle residents also have limited 
alternative options. Most of the available public parking infrastructure is 
restricted.20 And the alternatives that do exist are insufficient for the 
demand.21 In other words, parking violations can lead to the government 
pushing vehicle residents out of their vehicles—their homes—and onto the 
street.22 Many of these ordinances require attendance at special hearings 
to contest or mitigate the violations.23 The most harmful ones allow for the 
conversion of unpaid, noncriminal violations into misdemeanors, having 
the compounding effect of dragging vehicle residents into the criminal 
justice system and exposing them to its subsequent financial burdens and 
social penalties.24 
Meanwhile, courts have been hesitant to wade into what is potentially 
one of the “thorniest” of “political thickets,”25 given the complexity of 
issues underlying the dramatic growth of the unhoused population and the 
competing sociopolitical philosophies about how to best address those 
                                                     
 17. Living at the Intersection, supra note 8. 
 18. NATIONAL LAW CENTER, supra note 9. 
 19. Rianna Hidalgo, Nowhere To Go, REAL CHANGE (Jul. 22, 2015), http://www.realchange 
news.org/2015/07/22/nowhere-go [https://perma.cc/U4QL-D9KM] (“[W]hat is happening at large 
when it comes to the nearly 800 people who live in their vehicles in Seattle . . . has all the elements: 
parking regulations that offer limited options and lead to a concentrated area of vehicle residents; 
visible poverty and safety concern that fuels neighborhood tensions until they reach a boiling point; [] 
law enforcement officials caught inbetween [sic] the rock-and-hard-place of trying to enforce rules 
without harming vulnerable population . . . and public misperceptions about who the people truly are 
who reside within the RVs, trucks and cars on the streets of Seattle.”). 
 20. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
 21. See generally T. Ray Ivey & Jodilyn L. Gilleland, Hidden in Plain Sight: Finding Safe 
Parking for Vehicle Residents, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT (Sara Rankin 
ed., May 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3173221 [https://perma.cc/ 
KSK4-L5HW] (advocating for local governments or social service organizations to implement Safe 
Parking Programs, which “utilize existing public- or privately-owned parking infrastructure to provide 
vehicle residents with a safe, reliable, and legal place to park,” as part of a locality’s overall strategy 
for addressing homelessness). 
 22. Groover, supra note 6. 
 23. Living at the Intersection, supra note 8. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Paraphrasing the general proposition announced by Justice Frankfurter in reasoning against 
the justiciability of an issue arising in a legislative redistricting case because of the politically charged 
implications. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to enter this 
political thicket.”). 
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issues. In terms of a constitutional right to housing, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every 
social and economic ill . . . [and w]e are unable to perceive [] any 
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.”26 
Courts have routinely refused to recognize people experiencing 
homelessness as a possible “suspect class” under equal protection 
doctrine.27 And courts have stated that parking regulations on their own, 
without otherwise “attempt[ing] to regulate any constitutionally protected 
activity,” cannot be attacked as unconstitutional because “there is no 
constitutional or statutory right to park one’s car wherever one wants.”28 
In short, in the current judicial environment, one would not expect much 
in the form of judicial activism on behalf of those impacted by the 
overcriminalization of homelessness, especially not in the field of parking 
regulation. 
That said, two recent Ninth Circuit opinions indicate a possible shift 
in the bench’s general reluctance to entertain judicial interventions on 
behalf of homeless individuals.29 Because of those indications, actions 
seeking other such novel interventions could be filed as potential test 
cases. A case raising such a novel statutory claim, under Washington’s 
Homestead Act, was recently rejected in Seattle Municipal Court; 
however, that decision was subsequently overturned on appeal in King 
County Superior Court.30 That action and the specific novel claim raised 
will be introduced in Part II of this Note. Part III will explore two federal 
cases that signal a possible shift away from the bench’s general hostility 
toward judicial activism on issues of homelessness and homeless rights by 
reaching limited constitutional interventions. Part IV will present a closer 
                                                     
 26. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). 
 27. See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Homeless persons 
are not a suspect class”); see also Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 
n.36 (3d Cir. 1992) (homeless not a suspect class); D’Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879 n.2 
(11th Cir. 1995) (homeless not a suspect class); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 859 
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to be the first court to recognize fundamental right to sleep), dismissed, 
87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1994) 
(homeless not a suspect class), rev’d on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Davison v. City 
of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996) (homeless not a suspect class); State of Hawaii v. 
Sturch, 921 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that there is “no authority supporting a 
specific constitutional right to sleep in a public place” unless it is expressive conduct within the ambit 
of the First Amendment or is protected by other fundamental rights). But see Pottinger v. City of 
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (indicating in dicta that homeless might constitute a 
suspect class), remanded for limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 28. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Vill. of Orland Park, 139 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Amended Decision and Order on RALJ Appeal at 26, City of Seattle v. Long, No. 17-2-
15099-1 SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2018). 
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examination of Washington’s Homestead Act from both a textual 
interpretation and historical perspective to determine how amenable it 
might be as a path for judicial intervention. Part V will conclude by 
describing why Washington State courts should heed the signals of the 
Ninth Circuit and apply similar interventionist reasoning as the superior 
court in the Seattle test case when interpreting the Homestead Act. 
I. THE NOVEL STATUTORY CLAIM: HOMESTEAD ACT TEST CASE 
Mr. Steven Long is a long-time Seattle resident. He, like so many 
others, has found himself surviving without a permanent home since 
2014.31 Since then, he has depended on his truck as his primary means of 
shelter.32 For all intents and purposes, Mr. Long’s truck is his home. 
In the summer of 2016, Mr. Long had to find a new location to park 
his truck, which was experiencing mechanical issues—a common concern 
for vehicle residents attempting to survive while maintaining the few 
resources they possess. Mr. Long landed in a spot that he hoped was 
perfect; a spot that was out-of-the-way, unmarked, and unobtrusive.33 He 
even sought permission from the nearest local business owner.34 For three 
months, Mr. Long enjoyed a fleeting sense of stability.35 
Inevitably, Mr. Long’s luck ran out. Later that year, the Seattle Police 
Department, responding to an unrelated call in the area, were made aware 
of Mr. Long’s presence and cited him for violating Seattle’s ordinance 
prohibiting a vehicle from occupying a public parking spot for more than 
seventy-two hours.36 As a result, Mr. Long’s truck was impounded.37 With 
the assistance of a local legal aid and advocacy organization, Mr. Long 
challenged the impoundment of his vehicle under several constitutional 
and statutory theories. 
Although none of Mr. Long’s claims found success at the municipal 
court level,38 he successfully appealed the denial of his motion for 
summary judgment in King County Superior Court, which resulted in a 
critical win for vehicle residents.39 Among his claims, Mr. Long advocated 
                                                     
 31. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 1–2, City of Seattle v. Long, No. 203641306 
(Seattle Mun. Ct. Mar. 13, 2017). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. Id. at 2–3. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. at 3–4. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Order on Defense Motion for Summary Judgement at 3, City of Seattle v. Long, No. 
203641306 (Seattle Mun. Ct. May 10, 2017). 
 39. Laurel Wamsley, A Homeless Man’s Truck Is His Home, Judge Rules In Seattle, NPR: THE 
TWO-WAY (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/06/ 
591300547/a-homeless-mans-truck-is-his-home-judge-rules-in-seattle. 
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for a novel intervention by the Washington State courts on behalf of 
similarly situated vehicle residents. He sought and appears to have 
received a holding that will allow future vehicle residents to invoke 
Washington State’s Homestead Act as an affirmative protection barring, 
at least, enforcement of the specific Seattle ordinance Mr. Long was said 
to have violated,40 and potentially any other ordinance that would allow 
for extrajudicial impoundment of a known vehicle resident’s vehicle.41 
The City of Seattle intends to appeal the superior court’s decision.42 
This Note will argue that the relief that Mr. Long won on appeal and 
the interpretation of the Homestead Act announced by that court—
allowing for homestead exemption status to attach to a vehicle 
immediately upon its occupation as a primary means of residence by an 
otherwise unhoused individual43—is an entirely appropriate form of 
judicial intervention. Homestead status would bar enforcement authorities, 
such as the Seattle Police Department, from utilizing the impoundment 
mechanisms otherwise authorized by Chapter 46.55 of the Revised Code 
of Washington (RCW) (for reasons explored more fully in Part IV) against 
a known vehicle resident’s vehicle. Such a holding (especially in a court 
with a broader jurisdictional scope than King County Superior Court) 
could be criticized as a blatant act of judicial activism departing from the 
greater jurisprudential climate that cautions against such intervention on 
issues of homelessness and homeless rights.44 It is to this generally 
inhospitable jurisprudential environment where we turn next. 
II. RECENT EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS 
Before exploring why Washington’s Homestead Act is especially 
suited for judicial intervention on behalf of vehicle residents, this section 
will highlight two recent Ninth Circuit opinions that indicate a shift in the 
bench’s general hostility toward judicial interventions on behalf of 
homeless individuals. 
A. Jones v. City of Los Angeles 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jones v. City of Los Angeles is a 
relatively early example of the court signaling to “local governments [that 
                                                     
 40 Amended Decision, supra note 30, at 26. 
 41. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.55 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 42. Vianna Davila, Seattle Will Appeal Ruling that Man Living Inside His Truck Should Not 
Have Had to Pay High Fines After Vehicle was Towed, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:40 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/homeless/city-of-seattle-appeals-ruling-that-a-truck-is-a-
home/ (updated Mar. 8, 2018, 7:28 PM). 
 43. Amended Decision, supra note 30, at 26. 
 44. Davila, supra note 42 (quoting Deputy Seattle City Attorney John Schochet calling the ruling 
“legally wrong and unworkable”). 
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they] could not deny homeless populations shelter on the one hand and 
criminalize the only alternative they had—sleeping in the street and in 
public places—on the other.”45 The Jones case was brought by six 
unhoused individuals who had been arrested for violating what the court 
described as “one of the most restrictive municipal laws regulating public 
spaces in the United States” at the time.46 The ordinance stated that “[n]o 
person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public 
way.”47 
In district court, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction 
prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance between the hours of 9:00 p.m. 
and 6:30 a.m.48 They argued that due to the extreme breadth of the 
ordinance, allowing enforcement “twenty-four hours a day against persons 
with nowhere else to sit, lie, or sleep, other than on public streets and 
sidewalks” constituted criminalization of status as homeless individuals in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.49 
The district court disagreed, concluding that the ordinance simply 
penalized the conduct specified and therefore did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.50 This determination was grounded in the bench’s general 
reluctance to recognize homelessness as a constitutionally cognizable 
status by relying heavily on Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, in 
which a similar argument was rejected.51 The court in Joyce reasoned that 
Court[s] must approach with hesitation any argument that science or 
statistics compels a conclusion that a certain condition be defined as 
a status. The Supreme Court has determined that drug addiction 
equals a status, and this Court is so bound. But the Supreme Court 
has not made such a determination with respect to homelessness, and 
because that situation is not directly analogous to drug addiction, it 
would be an untoward excursion by this Court into matters of social 
policy to accord to homelessness the protection of status.52 
Thus, the importance of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jones can only 
be truly understood in light of this historical judicial prudence in homeless 
rights litigation. 
                                                     
 45. Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 879, 900 (2015). 
 46. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1125. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F.Supp. 843, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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By reversing the district court and remanding the issue back with 
instruction to grant appropriate injunctive relief,53 the Ninth Circuit was 
forced to justify its decision in an incongruous precedential environment. 
To accomplish this, the court grounded its analysis in the U.S. Supreme 
Court cases establishing addiction as a constitutionally recognized status 
under the Eighth Amendment: Robinson v. California54 and its progeny.55 
A task easier said than done, given the fact that “[t]he Court did not 
articulate the principles that undergird its holding [in Robinson],”56 which 
led to a fractured decision delivered by the Court in Powell v. Texas 
subsequently testing the addiction-as-status doctrine.57 
In Powell, an Eighth Amendment challenge was brought by a chronic 
alcoholic convicted under an ordinance prohibiting public drunkenness.58 
The Powell Court’s 4-1-4 split centered on whether Robinson stood for the 
proposition that criminalizing conduct that was involuntarily incidental to 
a cognizable status was precluded by the Eighth Amendment.59 Four 
members of the 4-1 plurality in Powell concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited only regulations that facially penalized status and 
did not apply because the State was free to regulate socially unacceptable 
conduct.60 
To reach its decision, the Jones court had to combine the four-justice 
dissent from Powell with the concurrence of the single justice that refused 
to join the plurality’s opinion despite agreeing with its result.61 This bit of 
judicial gymnastics allowed the Jones court to find that a five-member 
majority of the Court in Powell actually agreed that the correct 
construction of the rule from Robinson is “that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is 
the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”62 
The Jones court’s willingness to flex its analytical muscle to square 
the Eighth Amendment jurisprudential circle left by the Robinson and 
Powell decisions clearly signals that the court may be willing to intervene 
on the behalf of unjustly penalized individuals experiencing homelessness. 
Nonetheless, the court also took great pains to ensure that its opinion was 
                                                     
 53. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138. 
 54. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 55. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1131 (“The district court erred by not engaging in a more thorough 
analysis of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence under Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 1133. 
 57. See generally Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 58. Id. at 517. 
 59. See generally id. 
 60. See generally id. 
 61. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1135. 
 62. Id. 
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highly restrained. In its conclusion, the court prudentially hedged its 
opinion, stating: 
We do not suggest that Los Angeles adopt any particular social 
policy, plan, or law to care for the homeless. We do not desire to 
encroach on the legislative and executive functions reserved to the 
City Council and the Mayor of Los Angeles. There is obviously a 
“homeless problem” in the City of Los Angeles, which the City is 
free to address in any way that it sees fit, consistent with the 
constitutional principles we have articulated. By our decision, we in 
no way dictate to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for 
the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the 
streets of Los Angeles at any time and at any place within the City. 
All we hold is that, so long as there is a greater number of homeless 
individuals in Los Angeles than the number of available beds, the 
City may not enforce section 41.18(d) at all times and places 
throughout the City against homeless individuals for involuntarily 
sitting, lying, and sleeping in public. Appellants are entitled at a 
minimum to a narrowly tailored injunction against the City’s 
enforcement of section 41.18(d) at certain times and/or places.63 
Additionally, the opinion itself was subsequently vacated upon 
notice that the parties had settled the case and jointly agreed to dismiss 
their appeal.64 
That said, the analytical force and persuasive value of the Jones 
court’s construction of Eighth Amendment doctrine cannot be ignored. In 
fact, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement of interest in a 
subsequent similar case out of Idaho and clarified that it understood the 
correct construction of the Eighth Amendment to be the rule announced in 
Jones.65 
B. Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles 
Desertrain involved a challenge to another Los Angeles municipal 
ordinance. This ordinance made it a crime for anyone to utilize a vehicle 
for habitation on public property for more than one consecutive night 
anywhere within the city.66 The challenge was brought by multiple 
                                                     
 63. Id. at 1138 (citations omitted). 
 64. See Jones, 505 F.3d at 1006. 
 65. Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Bell v. Boise, 834 F.Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Idaho 
Aug. 6, 2015) (No. 1:09–cv–00540–REB) (“[T]he United States files this Statement of Interest to 
make clear that the Jones framework is the appropriate legal framework for analyzing Plaintiffs’ 
Eighth Amendment claims.”) rev’d and remanded, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013), partial summary 
judgement granted, 993 F.Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Idaho 2015), dismissed for lack of standing, sub nom. 
Martin v. Boise, No. 1:09–cv–00540–REB, 2015 WL 5708586 (D. Idaho 2015), appeal filed, Martin 
v. Boise, No. 15-35845 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015). 
 66. Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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plaintiffs who were arrested for violating the ordinance after the City 
began aggressively enforcing it in late 2010.67 Several constitutional 
claims were raised to challenge the ordinance, but the lower court granted 
the City summary judgment and refused to hear the plaintiff’s Fourteenth 
Amendment vagueness claim because it was not raised in the first 
amended complaint.68 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit not only found that the 
lower court’s refusal to hear the vagueness claim was an abuse of 
discretion but further held that the ordinance was void because it both 
failed “to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to 
understand what conduct it prohibits” and “encourage[d] arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”69 
The Desertrain opinion is an example of both judicial 
interventionism and prudential caution by the Ninth Circuit in addressing 
constitutional attacks to municipal legislation alleged to unfairly 
criminalize homelessness. By linking its opinion to past judicial efforts to 
deal with perceived legislative and executive injustices through the 
application—and to some degree, the contortion—of vagueness doctrine,70 
the court highlights its growing impatience with the continued 
criminalization of poverty and homelessness. 
The Desertrain court signals its interventionist intent in two primary 
ways. First, the court’s forceful language in concluding the opinion clearly 
indicates the interventionist principles underlying the decision. The court 
not only directly acknowledges the unique challenges that many vehicle 
residents face; it also sends a strong message to municipal legislators when 
it declares that “[the city] has many options at its disposal to alleviate the 
plight and suffering of its homeless citizens . . . [but s]electively 
preventing the homeless and the poor from using their vehicles for 
[otherwise legal] activities . . . should not be one of those options.”71 
Second, the court’s decision to review the Fourteenth Amendment 
vagueness claim on the merits to void the ordinance indicates the court’s 
waning tolerance of municipal legislation that targets and penalizes people 
experiencing poverty. The court’s waning tolerance can be seen in the 
grounding of its opinion in two historically significant Fourteenth 
Amendment cases. 
The court references the first of these two landmark cases in finding 
that the ordinance did not provide adequate notice to the public by 
                                                     
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1153. 
 69. Id. at 1155–57. 
 70. Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection 
of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 
102 (2002). 
 71. Desertrain, 754 F.3d at 1157–58. 
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analogizing to City of Chicago v. Morales, where the Supreme Court 
struck down a controversial anti-gang loitering prohibition.72 The Morales 
decision has been criticized as having “stretched vagueness doctrine nearly 
to its logical breaking point.”73 Nonetheless, the Morales Court’s opinion 
seemed to “harken[] back to [its] legendary effort to deal with obscenity: 
as with obscenity laws, the Court in effect indicated it could not define 
what constituted an unconstitutional anti-gang ordinance, but it knew one 
when it saw one.”74 
In its second historically significant case reference, the Desertrain 
court based its arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement decision on 
possibly the most famous of all vagueness doctrine cases, Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville.75 The court in fact states directly that the Los Angeles 
ordinance “raises the same concerns of discriminatory enforcement . . . [as 
the historically racist] city ordinance prohibiting vagrancy” struck down 
in Papachristou.76 
Despite this strong signaling by the court, the Desertrain opinion is 
still quite prudentially restrained. This prudential restraint is seen in the 
court’s choice not to address the merits of any of the other potential 
constitutional issues raised on appeal. By choosing to address the 
dispositive vagueness question, having to overrule a lower court 
procedural decision in order to do it,77 and cleanly resolving the presented 
controversy, the court was able to avoid addressing the potentially 
thornier—and the potentially more impactful, from a homeless rights 
advocacy perspective—constitutional questions regarding whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to travel and Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure doctrines provide viable claims to protect the rights of people 
experiencing homelessness.78 
III. A DEEPER DIVE INTO THE HOMESTEAD ACT 
All of the potential interventionist signaling in the world would be of 
no avail in this instance, though, if the act under which the novel statutory 
claim is raised is not amenable to an interpretation necessary for the court 
                                                     
 72. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999). 
 73. Strosnider, supra note 70. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); see Risa Goluboff, The 
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 78. Id. at 1153 n.2. 
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to reach a favorable decision. Fortunately, from a textual analytical 
approach, Washington’s Homestead Act appears to be ripe for just such 
an interpretation. Additionally, the underlying policies that have 
historically animated application and expansion of the Act’s exemptions 
further encourage an interventionist interpretation. 
One of the key reasons that the Homestead Act is an excellent 
candidate for an interventionist reading is because its language speaks in 
an exceptionally clear, unambiguous, and declarative manner. The 
operative language of the Act is codified generally in RCW chapter 6.13. 
Of significance, RCW § 6.13.010 defines a homestead as simply “real or 
personal property that the owner uses as a residence,”79 which would 
include a vehicle resident’s personal vehicle. The only relevant limitation 
expressed in the statute is that the owner of the property must intend to 
utilize the property as their principal residence.80 Once this definitional 
requirement is met, the Act is equally clear about its application of an 
automatic exemption from any form of forced sale to satisfy a judgement.81 
In fact, the Act expressly requires that a claimed homestead be presumed 
valid unless its validity is successfully contested in court.82 
In addition to these unambiguous mandates, the Act has historically 
been construed liberally and given broad effect.83 In fact, from a public 
policy perspective, homestead exemptions have been described as 
necessary “to prevent the weak from being overpowered by the strong.”84 
This combination of unambiguous mandate and liberal construction sets 
up a perfect playfield for judicial activism. 
However, even from this seemingly favorable statutory background, 
asserting homestead rights to protect a vehicle from authorized 
extrajudicial impoundment presents a few thorny questions that could 
allow a prudentially inclined bench to avoid the type of judicial 
intervention being sought. One obstacle, a potential interpretative conflict 
between the operative statutes, also appears to be the easiest to overcome. 
                                                     
 79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.010 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis 
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As addressed, the Homestead Act speaks directly to the question of 
whether homestead status should extend to a vehicle being used as a 
primary residence.85 The question then becomes whether the operative 
impoundment statute can be interpreted as authorizing a “forced sale to 
satisfy a judgement” from which the vehicle would be exempted as a 
homestead. 
From a purely textual analysis of the governing statute, the answer 
would presumably be yes. The statutory chapter governing the operations 
of authorized impoundments states that a “registered tow truck operator 
who has a valid and signed impoundment authorization has a lien upon the 
impounded vehicle for services provided in the towing and storage of the 
vehicle.”86 That is to say that the operator’s lien attaches immediately upon 
valid authorization of impoundment. Additionally, the same statute grants 
the operator an immediate “deficiency claim against the registered owner 
of the vehicle for services provided in the towing and storage of the 
vehicle.”87 In executing this deficiency claim, the operator is authorized to 
sell the vehicle at auction to satisfy the debt incurred by the registered 
owner.88 On the face of these provisions, it would appear extremely 
difficult to argue that this is not the exact type of “attachment and [] 
execution or forced sale for the debts of the owner” upon which the 
homestead exemption is supposed to operate.89 
Nonetheless, there are three additional lines of prudential arguments 
that could complicate what seems like a straight forward application of the 
Homestead Act’s protections in a case such as Long: (1) that the 
Homestead Act should not act as a procedural bar to the execution of an 
authorized impoundment; (2) that the type of lien that is authorized by the 
impoundment ordinance is included in the list of statutory exceptions to 
the Act’s protections; and (3) that the Act’s protections might be 
fraudulently invoked to avoid otherwise valid exercises of routine police 
activity. 
A. The Homestead Act as a Procedural Bar to Impoundment 
The first argument questions the procedural timing of the assertion 
of the exemption. Ideally, the most far reaching and impactful result from 
a homeless rights interventionist perspective would be a holding that 
would allow the assertion of the homestead exemption as a categorical bar 
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 86. Id. § 46.55.140. 
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to any authorization of an impoundment, whether valid or otherwise. That 
is to say, a holding that would allow a vehicle resident who has been 
notified of a violation that might otherwise result in the eventual 
impoundment of the vehicle (such as a violation of Seattle’s ordinance 
requiring a vehicle to move at least one block every seventy-two hours)90 
to inform the enforcement authority (e.g., the Seattle Police Department) 
of the vehicle’s homestead status to bar authorization of impoundment. 
While it is unclear if the court’s holding in the Long appeal goes this far, 
such a holding’s vulnerability in a future challenge would be two-fold. 
On one hand, there is concern that the ideal outcome would not 
actually be practical in operation. A reviewing court could find that an 
attachment or forced sale as contemplated by the Homestead Act is not 
implicated until after the actual removal of the vehicle as authorized by 
the city for violation of a public health and safety law.91 On another hand, 
because the registered owner has recourse after the removal of the vehicle 
to challenge the validity of any impoundment action,92 a more prudential 
reading of the statutes would indicate that the appropriate time to raise the 
homestead objection would be at an impoundment validity hearing. 
Either of these potentially more prudential interpretations run 
expressly counter to not only a textual reading of the relevant Homestead 
Act provisions but also to the spirit of the law as historically applied. As 
previously discussed, courts have construed the Act liberally and given it 
broad effect.93 The Homestead Act unambiguously states that homestead 
status attaches automatically to any personal property that is utilized as a 
person’s primary place of residence.94 Thus, the Act’s protections are 
invoked immediately upon authorization of impoundment of an otherwise 
eligible vehicle. Additionally, any argument that subordinates the Act’s 
exemption to employment only at an impoundment validation hearing 
would be contrary to the direct textual application of the governing statute. 
The Act is equally clear that homestead status is “presumed to be valid to 
the extent of all the property claimed exempt, until the validity thereof is 
contested in a court of general jurisdiction.”95 From a plain-language 
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interpretation of the statute, once a homestead exemption has been raised, 
the exemption is presumed valid and the burden falls on the enforcement 
agency to defeat the exemption in court in order to authorize any form of 
attachment, not the other way around.96 Thus, any attempted interpretation 
by a court that a homestead exemption would operate only as a means of 
invalidating the otherwise valid impoundment of a vehicle, after the 
impoundment and lien attachment had already occurred, is specifically 
violative of the express language of the homestead statutes. 
B. The List of Exceptions in the Homestead Acts 
The second line of prudential reasoning that could potentially limit 
the prospective scope of the Long appeal’s holding argues that a reviewing 
court should read the tow truck operator’s lien into the list of exceptions 
to the application of the homestead exemption included in the Act. 
Specifically, the Act states that the homestead status cannot be invoked to 
protect against “debts secured by mechanic’s, laborer’s, construction, 
maritime, automobile repair, material supplier’s, or vendor’s liens.”97 A 
prudentially-minded bench might choose to interpret the stated class of, 
for example, “vendor’s liens,” as ambiguous enough to include the type of 
lien contemplated by RCW § 46.55.140,98 applying the maxim of noscitur 
a sociis.99 
Arguably, the specific type of lien granted to the operator in 
RCW § 46.55.140, is a garageman’s lien.100 Thus, a more favorable 
construction of RCW § 6.13.080, from an interventionist perspective, 
would be to apply the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius101 to 
the list of excluded liens. If the legislature was intentionally specific when 
                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. § 6.13.080. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Burns v. City of Seattle, 164 P.3d 475, 485 (Wash. 2007) (stating “a doubtful term 
or phrase in a statute or ordinance takes its meaning from associated words and phrases”); City of 
Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 371 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Wash. 1962) (“That a term in a statute or ordinance 
takes its meaning from the context in which it is employed is so well accepted that citation of authority 
is unnecessary[.]”). 
 100. See generally David Harrison, Lien for Towing or Storage, Ordered by Public Officer, of 
More Vehicle, 85 A.L.R.3d 199 (2011) (defining the lien authorized for the towing or storage of a 
motor vehicle, ordered by a public officer, as a garageman’s lien); Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Tow 
Truck Operator’s Lien on Impounded Vehicle, 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.177 (2017) (discussing the 
specifics of the tow truck operator’s lien on impounded vehicle as a separate class of liens). 
 101. In re Cunningham, 163 B.R. 593, 595 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994) (“If the legislature wishes 
to create additional exceptions to the homestead exemption, it must do so clearly and specifically by 
adding them to the statute’s list of exceptions.”). See also In re Killian v. Seattle Pub. Sch., 403 P.3d 
58, 65 (Wash. 2017) (“When the legislature expresses one thing in a statute, we infer that omissions 
are exclusions.”); Det. of Williams, 55 P.3d 597, 604 (Wash. 2002) (“Under expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, a canon of statutory construction, to express one thing in a statute implies the 
exclusion of the other.”). 
258 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:243 
it crafted the list of equitable liens that would warrant exception from the 
application of the Homestead Act, then it was similarly intentional in 
deciding not to include a garageman’s lien in the list. This interpretation 
is in line with the legislature’s intent that the Act’s protections be given a 
very liberal construction.102 Thus, because this type of garageman’s lien, 
granted to tow truck operators by the impoundment statute,103 is not 
specifically listed among the types of liens exempted by the Homestead 
Act—“mechanic’s, laborer’s, construction, maritime, automobile repair, 
material supplier’s, or vendor’s liens”104—then it is not an exception to the 
homestead exemption. 
C. The Potential for Misuse of the Homestead Exemption 
The last bit of prudential reasoning that a reviewing court might fall 
back on in refusing to interpret the Long holding as allowing the 
homestead exemption to bar police from enforcing all impoundment 
ordinances would be a general concern for the potential misuse of such 
exemptions by people not actually experiencing homelessness. This fear 
could lead a reviewing court to decide that the Homestead Act was never 
meant to operate as a bar to routine police activity. 
But even this potential line of reasoning fails in the face of the plain 
text and historical application of homestead exemptions in Washington. 
The statute itself contemplates the possibility of fraudulent claims of 
homestead protection by those not actually residing in the property.105 That 
said, it also clearly shifts the burden of disproving the validity of the 
homestead exemption away from the property owner raising it.106 
There does, though, appear to be some contention in the courts 
regarding the procedural effect of this burden shifting.107 Most of the cases 
testing this procedural scheme arise in the form of interlocutory objections 
to execution of liens granted prior to the declaration of homestead in a 
bankruptcy action,108 but the factual scenario in the case of an extrajudicial 
impoundment authorization is completely different. In this case, the 
question is how the automatic attachment of homestead status 
contemplated by the Act operates in the face of the extrajudicial 
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attachment of a lien authorized by the combination of a municipal 
ordinance and a state statute. An interventionist court could seize on the 
strong language used by past courts regarding the policies underpinning 
the Homestead Act to conclude that in such cases the Act operates to 
protect the property owner at the point of lien attachment.109 
Additionally, it is not as if the local police (who are being asked to 
enforce these extrajudicial impoundment ordinances) are incapable of 
deciphering between a vehicle being used for habitation from those 
impermissibly parked for other reasons.110 Many of these same 
enforcement officials feel “caught inbetween [sic] the rock-and-hard-place 
of trying to enforce rules without harming vulnerable populations.”111 By 
allowing them to presume the validity of a homestead exemption112 when 
they encounter a vehicle resident who otherwise might be in violation of 
the seventy-two hour time limit, they would have a harm-reducing option 
that they currently lack. Thus, the clash of policy concerns that such an 
interpretation might engender—the poorly defensible public health and 
safety concerns supposedly addressed by the impoundment ordinances 
versus the forcefully articulated and historically grounded protection of 
homestead rights intended “to prevent the weak from being overpowered 
by the strong”113—can hardly be defended as a rationale against the Long 
appeal’s holding. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington’s Homestead Act is the perfect vehicle, no pun intended, 
for judicial intervention in Washington courts to protect vehicle residents 
from the harms of criminalizing a life-sustaining activity—utilizing their 
vehicle as a primary means of shelter. Unlike the judicial activism you see 
in cases like Jones and Desertrain, the intervention being advocated for 
here, as seen in the Long appeal’s Homestead Act holding, is necessarily 
already constrained by the fact that it entails interpretation of local laws 
rather than the expansion of federal constitutional law. Also, the holding 
is limited in scope by attaching only to vehicles being utilized as a primary 
form of residence. That said, its potential impact as a signal to state and 
local lawmakers cannot be overstated. The Long court’s interpretation of 
the Homestead Act could force both municipal and state lawmakers to 
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reconsider the use of punitive ordinances and statues as a means of 
addressing the “homelessness problem,” at least as it relates to vehicle 
residency.114 Of course, the full implications of Long’s holding and the 
Homestead Act’s viability as a pressure release valve for vehicle residents 
are yet to be realized. As the case makes its way through the appeals 
process, vehicle residents, both in Seattle and across the state, will be 
watching and waiting to see if the Washington courts continue the tradition 
of construing the Homestead Act liberally to protect the vulnerable from 
the powerful—to protect their homes. 
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